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This report is the first rigorous analysis of the economic impacts of current legislative 
proposals to raise CAFE under a reformed “attribute-based” structure. Whereas 
historically CAFE set one standard for all automakers, the reformed system 
fundamentally alters the impact of CAFE on individual companies by setting standards 
based on a vehicle attribute, such as size.  
 
Companies that market larger vehicles (e.g., the Big 3) will face a less stringent standard 
under a reformed CAFE design. For example, Markey-Platts sets an overall CAFE target 
of 35 miles per gallon in 2018, but we estimate the Detroit automakers would have to 
achieve only 33 miles per gallon while their competitors would need to achieve 38 miles 
per gallon (see Table ES-1). 
 
Table ES-1 
Alternative CAFE Standards by Automaker 
(Miles per gallon) 
 Base Markey-Platts H.R. 6 
Hill-
Terry 
 2005 2018 2020 2022 
Chrysler 22.0 33.3 33.3 30.9 
Ford 22.1 32.9 32.9 30.7 
GM 22.1 33.4 33.4 31.1 
Honda 28.2 39.2 39.2 34.3 
Nissan 24.0 36.5 36.5 32.6 
Toyota 26.5 37.5 37.5 33.3 
Others 27.4 39.3 39.3 34.3 
U.S. 
Market 23.7 35.0 35.0 32.0 
Memo:     
Big 3 22.1 33.2 33.2 30.9 
Non-Big 3 26.7 38.2 38.2 33.7 
 
A reformed CAFE could yield dramatically different impacts for the competitive position 
of individual automakers than the current system. Our preliminary findings suggest 
several key conclusions regarding attribute-based CAFE increases currently under 
consideration:  
 
• Increasing CAFE is cost-effective. Higher standards will require automakers to install 
more expensive equipment on vehicles; however, higher initial costs will be more 
than offset by fuel savings. For example, the cumulative cost of raising fuel economy 
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to 35 mpg by 2018 is $0.55 per gallon saved—about one-sixth of today’s fuel price. 
 
• Increasing CAFE can boost automakers’ profits. Higher CAFE standards can increase 
vehicle profits since vehicle prices will need to rise to pay for added fuel-saving 
technologies, and profits per vehicle will also rise (assuming ordinary profit margins). 
This is partially offset by slower growth in total vehicle sales caused by the higher 
prices. The net result in our analysis is automakers’ cumulative profits over the next 
decade increase by $9 - $23 billion. 
 
• Detroit’s automakers stand to receive most of the profit gains from higher CAFE. The 
value of an incremental one-mile-per-gallon improvement is higher for vehicles with 
lower initial fuel economy because more fuel will be saved over the life of the 
vehicle. In addition, profit margins are higher for higher priced vehicles. With 
product portfolios that are more concentrated in vehicle segments with lower fuel 
economy and higher prices (SUVs and pickups), Detroit automakers will be making 
improvements that have higher market value and higher profit margins. Their profits 
will be correspondingly higher (see Table ES-2). 
 
Table ES-2 
Change in Automakers’ Cumulative 
Profits 2008-2017 by Scenario 
($Billions) 
 Markey-Platts H.R. 6 
Hill-
Terry 
Chrysler $3.2  $2.7  $1.4  
Ford $4.7  $3.9  $2.0  
GM $6.6  $5.5  $2.9  
Honda $1.5  $1.3  $0.4  
Nissan $1.6  $1.3  $0.6  
Toyota $2.6  $2.2  $0.8  
Others $2.4  $2.1  $0.7  
U.S. Market $22.5  $18.9  $8.7  
Memo:    
Detroit 3 $14.4  $12.0  $6.3  
Non-Detroit 3 $8.1  $6.8  $2.4  
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Introduction 
This report is the first rigorous analysis of the economic impacts of current legislative 
proposals to raise CAFE under the reformed “attribute-based” structure. Whereas historic 
CAFE standards set one standard for every automaker, the reformed system 
fundamentally alters the impact of the standards on individual companies. Under the 
reformed CAFE structure, which applies to light trucks starting next year and is the 
leading proposal under discussion in Congress, each vehicle is assigned a fuel economy 
target based on vehicle attributes. Light truck targets are a function of the truck's 
"footprint" – that is, the area defined by the truck's wheels. Each automaker's truck CAFE 
target will be a sales-weighted average of the targets for its truck models—automakers 
that market larger vehicles will face a less stringent standard. 
  
To compare the impacts of the main Congressional CAFE proposals we estimated the 
CAFE target for each vehicle by using a hypothetical function that we applied 
consistently across ALL vehicles, both cars and light trucks. Our results clearly show that 
the proposals create a DIFFERENT type of CAFE than in the past. Many in Washington 
are discussing the old form of CAFE, and are not directly dealing with the new reformed, 
attribute-based CAFE that legislative proposals would actually create. There are big 
differences. 
  
The most important difference is that the Detroit automakers will not have to meet the 
same standard as their foreign-owned competitors. Because their vehicles are larger, the 
Detroit automakers will face lower CAFE targets. For example, Markey-Platts sets an 
overall CAFE target of 35 miles per gallon in 2018, but the Detroit automakers would 
have to achieve only 33 miles per gallon in our analysis while their competitors would 
need to achieve 38 miles per gallon. 
  
The new attribute-based CAFE is not one size fits all. It takes into account the differences 
between vehicles and light trucks, which will have lower targets than cars.  
 
Most analyses of CAFE have emphasized the increases in vehicle costs or consumer 
prices created by new technologies to improve fuel economy. In contrast, our analysis 
looks at the profits the automakers will earn from these new technologies and finds that 
all automakers will have higher profits under the proposed CAFE enhancements. The 
Detroit automakers will need to invest in improved fuel economy, but by narrowing their 
competitive fuel economy disadvantage they will gain market share and reap more profits 
than their competitors. 
 
Detroit automakers have not been losing profits and eliminating jobs because CAFE 
forced them to produce vehicles with better fuel economy--they have been losing profits 
and eliminating jobs because the rising fuel prices over the last several years revealed that 
their vehicles have worse fuel economy than consumers want. The enhancements to 
CAFE are motivated by widely shared bipartisan concerns over global warming and 
national security. Our research shows that addressing these concerns will also improve 
the competitive position of American automakers and workers.  
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This summary report presents highlights of the results of a broader study that will be 
published in more detail in September 2007. This report compares the CAFE provisions 
of three current alternatives assuming that whatever is ultimately enacted would be 
implemented through an attribute-based CAFE system.  
 
The report is organized as follows. The CAFE elements of the proposals are listed using 
their common names. Then each automaker’s unique fuel economy target under the 
alternatives are compared. This is followed by an examination of the implications of the 
attribute-based CAFE system on the fuel economy of aggregate vehicle segments. Then 
we summarize the impacts on automaker profits and on billions of gallons of fuel saved 
by vehicles sold from 2008 through 2017. We then review the implications of the 
attribute-based system on the fuel economy needed by automaker and segment to meet a 
market-level CAFE target of 35 miles per gallon. The sales-weighted average targets for 
an automaker’s vehicles define the automaker’s CAFE target, but the automaker is 
allowed to manage the fuel economy improvements as it sees fit. This means that the 
actual fuel economy for any vehicle need not equal its individual target, so long as the 
automaker attains its overall target. Automakers can use this to increase their profits. 
CAFE Scenarios 
For this report we examined three scenarios that represent the alternatives being 
considered by the Congress. We are simulating only the CAFE elements of each 
alternative, which we assume are binding on all automakers. This means that we also 
assume neither “exit ramps” nor much regulatory discretion to be exercised by the 
Secretary of Transportation. The scenarios are: 
 
1. Markey-Platts is the most aggressive of the proposals. This House proposal calls 
for a market-level average fuel economy of 35 miles per gallon by 2018. From 
2018 through 2025 it calls for annual improvements of 4% at the market level, 
making the 2025 average fuel economy 46.1 miles per gallon. 
2. H.R. 6 is also called the CLEAN Energy Act of 2007 that was passed by the 
Senate on 6/21/07. It also calls for a market-level average fuel economy of 35 
miles per gallon, but not until 2020. After 2020 it sets no mandatory increases so 
we assume the target remains at 35 miles per gallon. 
3. Hill-Terry is the weakest of the proposals. It sets a market-level average fuel 
economy target of 32 miles per gallon in 2022 with an upper limit of 35 miles per 
gallon. We assumed that no further improvements would be required after 2022. 
 
In running the simulations and in predicting the impact of raising CAFE standards we 
modeled all three proposals as if they established binding numerical targets for fuel 
economy measured at the total U.S. market level. This means that we are comparing each 
proposal’s best-case outcome for improvements in fuel economy with each other. If Hill-
Terry were more likely to permit not meeting its target that the other proposals, for 
example because it extends CAFE credits for flexible-fuel vehicles that could run on E85 
but seldom do, then comparing best cases would understate the difference between Hill-




Our findings are based on a hypothetical reformed CAFE program that we developed for 
this report and an economic simulation model of the U.S. light vehicle market. The 
hypothetical CAFE program uses the same type of function that will be used to set light 
truck CAFE targets beginning in 2008 as described in NHTSA (2006). We assume that 
future CAFE regulations will be defined for all light vehicles, rather that separately for 
cars and trucks. A single size-based function was applied to all vehicles to set each 
automaker’s CAFE standard for the simulations. 
 
The assessment of each CAFE proposal was carried out through the following steps: 
1. Define a hypothetical CAFE function to set fuel economy targets for individual 
vehicles. The function needs to set vehicle targets so that the average (weighted 
by sales) equals the market level CAFE standard. 
2. Defined the CAFE standard for each automaker as the average target (weighted 
by sales) of its vehicle’s. 
3. Estimate the impact of the CAFE standards on vehicle sales, prices, fuel 
economy, and profits with a market simulation model. 
4. Using the results of the market simulation along with some important simplifying 
assumptions; estimate the path that fuel economy, sales, prices, and profits will 
follow for the next decade.  
The Hypothetical CAFE Function 
CAFE is introduced into the market simulation using a mathematical function that defines 
a fuel economy target for each vehicle based on its footprint. These targets are then used 
to define the CAFE standards for automakers. The function is described in the final rule 
for 2008-2011 model year light trucks NHTSA (2006). 
  
The fuel economy target, T, for a specific vehicle with a fuel economy of x and a 






The parameters of the function are: the highest targeted mpg (a), the lowest targeted mpg 
(b), the footprint (c) that is midway between the footprints that correspond to the highest 
and lowest mpg targets, and the curvature (d). 
 
The overall CAFE standard that is binding on an automaker is the sales-weighted average 
mpg target that the function sets for its vehicles. We used this functional form for the 
hypothetical CAFE function and applied it to both cars and trucks in the market 
simulation. The automakers do not need to meet all the individual vehicle targets, just 
their overall CAFE standard. 
 
 Market CAFE Standard 
 35.0 mpg 32.0 mpg 
Highest target 49.00 45.25 
Lowest target 24.25 25.55 
Mid-point footprint  49.00 45.00 
Curvature 5.00 6.00 
 
We established the hypothetical CAFE function for each market level CAFE standard 
through an iterative process that ensured that the base sales weighted fuel economy target 
is equal to the market level CAFE standard. We started by making initial guesses for the 
four parameters, calculated the fuel economy targets for the base vehicles, and the 
computed the sales weighted average of these initial targets. If the initial sales weighted 
target was not equal to the market level CAFE standard then we revised the parameters 
and computed the sales weighted average fuel economy target again. We continued the 
iterations until the difference between the sales weighted average target and the market 
level CAFE standard was less than 0.05 miles per gallon. The parameter values that 
resulted from this process are shown in the table above. (There are three CAFE 
alternatives but both Markey-Platts and H.R. 6 mandate 35 miles per gallon, though 
Market-Platts makes the industry achieve it two years earlier.) 
The Market Simulation 
To estimate the impact on the vehicle market of an attribute based CAFE standard, we 
use a market simulation model. The simulation starts with the market in equilibrium prior 
to the change in the CAFE standards. This means that for each vehicle, given its price and 
fuel economy, supply equals demand. The introduction of the higher CAFE standards 
leads to a new equilibrium that is reached in the simulation through two steps. In the first 
step, automakers choose how much to change the fuel economy of their vehicles. In the 
second step, sales quantities and prices adjust to bring supply and demand back into 
equality. 
 
The supply function for fuel economy improvements defines the minimum price the 
automaker needs to receive for the vehicle to cover the incremental costs of labor and 
materials as well as the normal profit margins for this type of technology. We base our 
supply functions on the fuel economy technologies / vehicle price curves that Greene et 
al. (2005) derived from NAS (2002). 
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We use a data driven discrete choice model to predict the changes in consumer demand in 
response to CAFE driven changes in fuel economy. The consumer demand model uses 
UMTRI-AAD’s Consumer Choice Model (CCM). The CCM is a mixed multinomial logit 
(MML). The MML is a very flexible format that recognizes that not all consumers have 
the same preferences for vehicle characteristics. The parameters of the CCM were 
estimated with market data for 2002-2005. 
Projections 2008-2017 
To project the impacts of the CAFE changes for the years 2008-2017, we used the market 
simulation results to create a linear extrapolation from base conditions (applied to 2008) 
to predicted conditions in the year in which the increase in the CAFE is completed (2018 
for Markey-Platts, 2020 for H.R. 6, and 2022 for Hill-Terry). The base projections 
assume no growth in vehicle sales and no change in vehicle mix. These assumptions let 






Alternative CAFE Standards by Automaker 
(Miles per gallon) 
 Base Markey-Platts H.R. 6 
Hill-
Terry 
 2005 2018 2020 2022 
Chrysler 22.0 33.3 33.3 30.9 
Ford 22.1 32.9 32.9 30.7 
GM 22.1 33.4 33.4 31.1 
Honda 28.2 39.2 39.2 34.3 
Nissan 24.0 36.5 36.5 32.6 
Toyota 26.5 37.5 37.5 33.3 
Others 27.4 39.3 39.3 34.3 
U.S. 
Market 23.7 35.0 35.0 32.0 
Memo:     
Big 3 22.1 33.2 33.2 30.9 




New Equilibrium Average Fuel Economy by 
Segment Under Alternative CAFE Standards 
(Miles per gallon) 
 Base Markey-Platts H.R. 6 
Hill-
Terry 
 2005 2018 2020 2022 
CAR 28.9 41.6 41.6 37.6 
CUV 25.7 37.2 37.2 33.7 
MINIVAN 23.7 35.6 35.6 32.1 
PU 19.2 29.7 29.7 27.5 
SUV 19.8 29.4 29.4 27.0 
VN 17.7 27.3 27.3 25.4 
Market 23.7 35.0 35.0 32.0 
     





New Equilibrium Market Shares Under 
Alternative CAFE Standards  
(Miles per gallon) 
 Base Markey-Platts H.R. 6 
Hill-
Terry 
 2005 2018 2020 2022 
Chrysler 13.5% 13.6% 13.6% 13.6% 
Ford 20.0% 20.1% 20.1% 20.0% 
GM 26.2% 26.4% 26.4% 26.3% 
Honda 8.6% 8.5% 8.5% 8.5% 
Nissan 6.4% 6.3% 6.3% 6.4% 
Toyota 13.3% 13.2% 13.2% 13.2% 
Others 12.0% 11.9% 11.9% 12.0% 
U.S. Market 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Memo:     
Big 3 59.7% 60.1% 60.1% 59.9% 
Non-Big 3 40.3% 39.9% 39.9% 40.1% 
     
Total Sales 




Gallons of Fuel Saved 2008-2017 by 
Scenario and Automaker (billions) 
 Markey-
Platts 
H.R. 6 Hill-Terry 
Chrysler 28.2 24.5 17.8 
Ford 39.4 34.1 25.0 
GM 53.9 46.8 34.1 
Honda 11.2 9.7 5.0 
Nissan 12.2 10.6 6.9 
Toyota 19.4 16.7 9.6 
Others 17.5 15.1 8.2 




Gallons of Fuel Saved 2008-2017 by 
Scenario and Automaker (billions) 
 Markey-
Platts 
H.R. 6 Hill-Terry 
Chrysler 28.5  24.7  15.2  
Ford 40.1  34.7  21.5  
GM 54.6  47.3  29.2  
Honda 12.0  10.4  4.6  
Nissan 12.6  10.9  6.0  
Toyota 20.6  17.8  8.7  
Others 18.5  16.0  7.4  
U.S. Market 186.9  161.8  92.5  
Memo:    
$ Cost per 




Change in Automakers’ Cumulative 
Revenue 2008-2017 by Scenario 
($Billions) 
 Markey-Platts H.R. 6 
Hill-
Terry 
Chrysler $17.5  $14.1  $7.3  
Ford $25.0  $20.2  $10.7  
GM $34.0  $27.4  $14.3  
Honda $9.9  $8.0  $2.9  
Nissan $8.8  $7.1  $3.2  
Toyota $16.2  $13.1  $5.3  
Others $14.7  $11.9  $4.4  
U.S. Market $126.0  $101.9  $48.0  
Memo:    
Detroit 3 $76.4  $61.7  $32.3  




Change in Automakers’ Cumulative 
Profits 2008-2017 by Scenario 
($Billions) 
 Markey-Platts H.R. 6 
Hill-
Terry 
Chrysler $3.2  $2.7  $1.4  
Ford $4.7  $3.9  $2.0  
GM $6.6  $5.5  $2.9  
Honda $1.5  $1.3  $0.4  
Nissan $1.6  $1.3  $0.6  
Toyota $2.6  $2.2  $0.8  
Others $2.4  $2.1  $0.7  
U.S. Market $22.5  $18.9  $8.7  
Memo:    
Detroit 3 $14.4  $12.0  $6.3  




Cumulative Costs of Technologies 
2008-2017 by Scenario 
($Billions) 
 Markey-Platts H.R. 6 
Hill-
Terry 
Chrysler $14.30  $11.40  $5.90  
Ford $20.30  $16.30  $8.70  
GM $27.40  $21.90  $11.40  
Honda $8.40  $6.70  $2.50  
Nissan $7.20  $5.80  $2.60  
Toyota $13.60  $10.90  $4.50  
Others $12.30  $9.80  $3.70  
U.S. Market $103.50  $83.00  $39.30  
Memo:    
$ Cost per 
Gallon saved $0.55  $0.51  $0.42  
Memo:       
Detroit 3 $62.00  $49.70  $26.00  
Non-Detroit 3 $41.40  $33.40  $13.30  
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